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SIGNATURES OF THE IMPOSSIBLE 
RANJANA KHANNA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
What’s in a name?  Halley’s article takes as its starting point masculine 
identification in the signature “Ian Halley.”  But the designation of Ian as a 
“masculine” name perhaps causes one to fall into a trap that Halley has set for 
readers.  Pointing out the “gender” of a name, particularly in a language that 
does not inscribe gender in nouns, adjectives, or past participles, commits a 
feminist error of always inscribing gender or attributing discrimination along 
gendered lines to every aspect of living.  Gender thus carries the attributes of 
value.  It is from Ian’s performative and phantasmatic iteration that Halley en-
gages two writers, Leo Bersani and Duncan Kennedy, who adopt a “queer” 
theoretical position that must, in Halley’s view, depart from feminism.  Decry-
ing a form of moralism apparently endemic to contemporary feminism, Halley 
gives a reading of cultural feminism’s roots in some of the more radical provoca-
tions from MacKinnon and Dworkin, only to underscore how contemporary 
feminism, for better and for worse, has rejected all that was radical in those al-
ready highly problematic positions.1 
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 1. Ian Halley, Queer Theory By Men, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7 (2004).  Halley uses several 
articles as reference points, including: Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave? 43 OCTOBER 197 (1987), re-
printed in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1996); Duncan 
Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309 
(1992), reprinted in DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 126 (1993); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).  Halley also implicitly addresses An-
drea Dworkin’s works.  ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981) [herein-
after PORNOGRAPHY]; ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987) [hereinafter INTERCOURSE].  For an in-
teresting and wonderfully written critique of the pornography debates, see Mary Joe Frug, A 
Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto, in POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 125 (1992).  Frug’s analysis 
leads her to plead that she not be seen as anti-feminist for opposing the ordinances set forth by 
MacKinnon and Dworkin.  Duncan Kennedy’s thinking follows in Frug’s vein. 
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MacKinnon and Dworkin would call upon the law to reject its “male” posi-
tion, condemning sex, and the violence that for them necessarily is involved in 
heterosexual intercourse.2  They failed to acknowledge the pleasures of violence 
or debasement, and they continued to have absolute faith in the power of the 
law to effectuate change in women’s cultural, economic, and political realms.3  
Cultural feminism, drawing on a similar view of masculine forms of violence, 
condemns the undervaluing of values and sexual practices deemed “feminine.”4  
It insists upon the value of that which has been subordinated, that is, the femi-
nine.  According to Halley, imbuing the subordinated with intrinsically positive 
value also occurs in some queer theory in which power of the subordinated be-
comes linked to the attribution of value, and the forms of signification that fol-
low.5  When Halley appreciates the argument that ensues, however, she reads 
queer studies as offering a parody of the feminist move because of its far more 
radical sense of sexuality.6  In an earlier draft of Halley’s article, authorship was 
signified, and therefore a certain authority given over to, a signature which has 
here been substituted: Janet Halley became Ian Halley.  I note that copyright is 
still held by Janet in Ian’s article, and I ask myself why that may be.  If Janet Hal-
ley owns the words of Ian Halley, what is suggested about the constitution of 
the self, responsibility, and agency designated in the signature and in the name 
of the copyright holder?  Perhaps the “true” copyright ought to belong to a 
“Halley who is divided, multiplied, conjugated, shared,” and perhaps even to 
Bersani and Kennedy, MacKinnon and Dworkin.7  Janet seems particularly keen 
to maintain ownership of Ian, and in some ways continues to insist her presence 
even though she presents herself as absent.  I note also that this was once a talk, 
but I will confine myself to the dynamics of written communication, and the 
meanings that emerge in signatures, because I was not present for the oral per-
 
 2. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 1; DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE , supra note 1. 
 3. Halley, supra note 1, at 17-18 (discussing this in the context of Bersani’s departure from 
MacKinnon). 
 4. It is unclear to me who Halley has in mind when she discusses cultural feminism, but some 
figures that fit broadly into this paradigm are JOSEPHINE DONOVAN, FEMINIST THEORY: THE 
INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN FEMINISM (1992) and SANDRA GILBERT & SUSAN GUBAR, THE 
MADWOMAN IN THE ATTIC (1979). 
 5. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 1, at 15, 17-18 (discussing Bersani). 
 6. This seems to be why she is less critical of Bersani’s endorsement of gay sexuality than of 
feminism’s, as if gay sex was in and of itself radical.  It is true that Bersani’s argument throughout 
the essay stresses the dark underside of what has been deemed negative.  It is not, however, the case 
that the basic structure of evaluation changes in Bersani’s endorsement in a way that is radically dif-
ferent from cultural feminism’s.  There may well be different agendas and different consequences, 
but the value-form remains present.  See Halley, supra note 1, at 19-26. 
 7. Jacques Derrida has written on the problem of ownership,  acknowledgment, and the consti-
tution of a unitary self.  See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, Limited Inc a b c . . . (1977), reprinted in LIMITED 
INC 29 (Samuel Weber trans. & Gerald Graff ed., 1988) [hereinafter DERRIDA, Limited]. He addresses 
his remarks to John Searle who had criticized Derrida’s essay entitled Signature Event Context (1972), 
reprinted in LIMITED INC 1 (Alan Bass trans. & Gerald Graff ed., 1988) [hereinafter DERRIDA, Signa-
ture].  I am altering Derrida’s words here, when he writes “the true copyright ought to belong (as is 
indeed suggested along the frame of this tableau vivant) to a Searle who is divided, multiplied, conju-
gated, shared.  What a complicated signature!”  DERRIDA, Limited, supra, at 31. 
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formance.8  My response will consider the question of value, what was remain-
dered in the substitution of Janet for Ian, and the constitution of the self some-
times proposed in the proffering of a signature.  
II.  TAKING A BREAK, DISAVOWAL, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE EGO 
Halley’s article proposes that it would be good both for feminism, and for 
“left/liberal/progressives” to “Take a Break from Feminism.”9  In a classic ex-
pression of disavowal, the logic of which Octave Mannoni succinctly described 
in the phrase “I know very well, but even so . . . ,”10 Halley writes: 
There are many good reasons to think [taking a break from feminism] is a bad 
idea. . . .  In this essay I hope it will be permissible to circumscribe my goal: I 
want to provide an elaboration, in a somewhat high degree of detail, of some 
conceptual moves that may be possible only if one pursues a divergence be-
tween feminism and queer theory as I imagine it.11 
Feminism is circumscribed, queer theory is full of imaginative possibility.  
Feminism is known to insist upon its importance, nagging that it is a bad idea to 
leave it behind.  But even so, Halley’s version of the necessity for queer theory’s 
divergence from feminism involves a conscious choice to ignore the nagging, as 
well as the ambiguities to which it gives rise.  In this gesture “feminism,” in 
spite of the lip service given to “sex positive” feminism, as well as those femi-
nisms whose agenda is not that of MacKinnon or cultural feminists, apparently 
needs to be rejected.  What remains of feminism’s important questions, and its 
nagging, is therefore left behind.  I would furthermore suggest that Halley’s re-
lationship to it is unresolved.  This allows Halley to give queer theory a utopian 
quality, and simultaneously see feminism only in terms of its manifested limita-
tions. 
Not only does feminism provide the model for valuation of the subordi-
nated, in Halley’s nominalist version, feminism is plagued by a need to distin-
guish between m and f (whether male/female; masculine/feminine; or men and 
women).  As queer theory does not have to rest its case on this binary of gender 
according to Halley, it would serve it well to take a break from feminism.  Two 
important questions arise from this: (1) does feminism, any more or less than 
queer theory, really have to be primarily about gender and the logic of m/f? 
(That is, didn’t “difference” feminism already tackle this problem?); and (2) 
what is compromised when the “supplement of gender”12 is not only critiqued, 
remaindered, and exchanged, but actually left behind and abandoned? 
 
 8. I am gesturing towards an idea of signature discussed later in this article, and drawing on 
Jacques Derrida’s essay Signature Event Context, supra note 7.  Derrida draws on the work of J.L. Aus-
tin, when Austin writes, interpolating his readers/audience in his explanation of communication 
with the use of the possessive “our,” “Still confining ourselves, for simplicity, to spoken utterance.”  
J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 113 (1962). 
 9. Halley, supra note 1, at 9. 
 10. OCTAVE MANNONI, Je sais bien, mais quand même, in CLEFS POUR L’IMAGINAIRE 9 (1969). 
 11. Halley, supra note 1, at 9. 
 12. By “supplement of gender,” I mean, in this context, the way in which gender difference, as 
understood by feminism, is deemed irrelevant while at the same time resulting in the subordination 
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Halley refers to a “divergentist” theory, which recognizes and underscores 
the different political agendas among feminists and queer theorists and activists, 
as a way in which one may deal with distinctions among political and theoreti-
cal positions between feminist and queer studies.13  In this attempt to divert the 
two fields and theoretical bodies, however, she exaggerates differences and does 
not attend to the problems of diversion that may arise.  She claims that “conver-
gentist” logic, which tries to make necessary the coexistence or intersectionality 
of a variety of liberal/leftist positions around gender, sexuality, and indeed class 
and race, conflate different agendas in ways that do not allow attention to the 
differences and divergences.14  It would seem to me, however, that the logic in-
volved in both divergentist and convergentist agendas is the same, and it leads 
to the exclusion of alterity at the moment of conceiving political possibility.15 
Halley’s appreciative departure from Bersani and Kennedy, who explicitly 
attempt to re-think questions of sexuality in the post-AIDS moment in the 
United States, involves pitting their theories with and against feminist taxono-
mies in the United States today.16  Both writers acknowledge great debt to forms 
of feminism that have disabused us of too-rosy concepts of sexuality, and the 
normative and bourgeois ideas of good and bad sexual practices and fantasies 
that accompany this.17  They both offer critiques of some feminist thinkers; they 
also are greatly indebted, and feel no need to leave feminism itself entirely be-
hind.  Duncan Kennedy thinks of himself as not a “feminist any more than he 
thinks of himself as a black nationalist,”18 but writes this in light of the influence 
on him of Jane Gallop, Judith Butler, and Mary Joe Frug (in memory of whom 
Kennedy’s essay is dedicated).  The implicit point is that he does not see femi-
nism as an identity position, but he finds some feminist work rather useful in its 
structuralist and post-structuralist veins.  The whole essay is, in some ways, a 
protracted relation to the feminist thinker to whom it is dedicated.  Hardly lay-
ing feminism to rest, it is a thinking through of the limitations of some femi-
nisms in light of others.  It is true that the desire to not count oneself as a femi-
nist is a dismissal of a certain position, but the criticism of some feminisms 
(particularly governance feminism) is hardly news in the feminist academy.  A 
feminist, more often than not, is someone who does some form of feminist work, 
just as a post-structuralist is someone who does some post-structuralist work.  A 
 
of one gender by another, thus being remaindered because its demands cannot be met by the sup-
posedly “gender-free” discourse put in its place. 
 13. Halley, supra note 1, at 46 n.134. 
 14. See id. at 29. 
 15. For interesting, but I think ultimately flawed notions of the “intersections” of race and sex, 
see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; 
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT  
357 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).  Wendy Brown’s essay, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, 
gives an excellent summary of a variety of arguments against the notion of intersectionality, explain-
ing how different modalities of power do not end up constituting subjects who are formed in dis-
crete relations to these powers.  Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 420-34 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
 16. See Halley, supra note 1, at 14-38. 
 17. Bersani, supra note 1, at 212-15; KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 150-58. 
 18. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 129. 
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feminist is not necessarily, and in fact is not usually, simply someone who iden-
tifies with the most banal form of outdated or misguided feminism.  Indeed, 
some define feminism as critique precisely because of its self-critical attitude.19  
Bersani, who discusses the “value of sexuality itself . . . (as the demeaning of) the seri-
ousness of efforts to redeem it”20 after having discussed feminist attempts to redeem 
it, nonetheless sees their feminist analysis of sexuality as demeaning as the 
groundwork for his own discussion.  It is Bersani’s essay that will become the 
focus of my response to Halley. 
Bersani begins provocatively with the statement, “[t]here is a big secret 
about sex: most people don’t like it.”21  This does not, of course, mean that most 
people do not have it.  Following Catharine MacKinnon’s insights around forms 
of debasement women experience in heterosexual sex, Bersani writes of how this 
is a position that needs acknowledgment as attractive as well as potentially abu-
sive.22  In MacKinnon’s rendition, by contrast, there is no room for men to ex-
perience or enjoy feelings of debasement.23  They are always positioned as ag-
gressors; and debasement is always considered negatively.  Halley concurs with 
Bersani on this point.24  She ambiguously departs from him, however, in a prob-
lem that she sees as deriving from cultural feminism: the value ascribed to the 
subordinate.25  Whereas MacKinnon was unequivocal in her condemnation, Ber-
sani insists on the value of the subordinate position.26  It is from this position that 
he can criticize the murderously puritanical mainstream representation of AIDS, 
and the equally lethal evaluation of  good sex and bad sex, particularly in state 
sponsored campaigns, in principle aiming to reduce the spread of HIV, but in 
practice geared toward the lowest risk groups.27  Embracing abjection as a mo-
 
 19. And perhaps needless to say, given my tone, many feminists like myself are increasingly 
frustrated by the characterization of feminism which fails to take into account the very complex and 
varied historical relations with Marxism, liberalism, psychoanalysis, socialism and other social 
movements only to be redeemed by something vaguely designated “postmodern.”  I suppose I 
would count as a postmodern feminist, albeit with a psychoanalytic and postcolonial touch, but the 
lack of precision of the term “postmodern” leaves it designating nothing other than post-1968 cul-
tural theory.  Deconstructive, Lacanian, and Foucaultian readings are, after all, not the same even 
though they may all be sexily postmodern in the accounts given by Frug, supra note 1, passim and 
KENNEDY, supra note 1, passim.  Greater attention to this vagueness would be welcome in words that 
critique some feminist positions or practices for good reason. 
 20. Bersani, supra note 1, at 222. 
 21. Id. at 197. 
 22. He writes: 
Needless to say, the ideological exploitations of this fantasmatic potential have a long and 
inglorious history.  It is mainly a history of male power, and by now it has been richly 
documented by others.  I want to approach this subject from a quite different angle, and to 
argue that a gravely dysfunctional aspect of what is, after all, the healthy pleasure we take 
in the operation of a coordinated and strong physical organism is the temptation to deny 
the perhaps equally strong appeal of powerlessness, of the loss of control. 
Id. at 216-17. 
 23. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 3, 6-7. 
 24. Halley, supra note 1, at 17. 
 25. Halley, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
 26. Bersani, supra note 1, at 217. 
 27. Bersani writes about these campaigns, “TV treats us to nauseating processions of yuppie 
women announcing to the world that they will no longer put out for their yuppie boyfriends unless 
these boyfriends agree to use a condom.”  Bersani, supra note 1, at 202.  This statement is, of course, 
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ment of the undoing of self, in which uncontrollable regressive identifications 
cannot come to fruition, he writes, “[t]he self is a practical convenience; pro-
moted to the status of an ethical ideal, it is a sanction for violence.”28  He adds in 
a footnote, “[t]his sentence could be rephrased, and elaborated, in Freudian 
terms, as the difference between the ego’s function of ‘reality-testing’ and the 
superego’s moral violence (against the ego).”29  The super-ego, in Freudian the-
ory, constitutes a regulatory mechanism through which “conscience” violently 
imposes itself on the ego.  As I will explain, the ego’s relation to reality-testing, 
when hindered by melancholia, can challenge the notion of sovereignty and 
selfhood that relies on moral violence.30 
I have no interest at all in responding to Halley in a defense of all kinds of 
feminism.  In many of its renditions, I also find feminism regressive and mis-
guided.  I do not dispute the idea that a whole range of mistakes have been 
made by feminists and in the name of feminism, ranging from misguided well-
meaning gestures to deliberately regressive and reactionary moves that are 
complicit with and fail to critique a dominant politics, whether of the puritanical 
and murderous, neo-liberal late capitalist, or the conservative imperial ilk.  
Rather than defending a movement that has undeniably at times been guilty, I 
will propose why leaving feminism behind, and believing that it can be left be-
hind, is itself a politically and conceptually misguided ploy that is complicit 
with a neo-liberal heterosexist paradigm.  Rather than disavowal, I will propose 
melancholia. 
 
difficult to read in terms of feminism.  It is strange to think of Bersani as being for Halley in some 
ways too much of a feminist.  But the difficulty of the reading is perhaps Halley’s larger point.  How 
do feminists assess both the statement and the yuppie women?  Will these “yuppie women” inevita-
bly be endorsed (possibly by some varieties of culturalist feminism)?  Will Bersani’s statement be 
seen as evidence of misogyny (possibly by MacKinnonite and Dworkian feminists)?  Is simply ignor-
ing the statement’s figuring of woman what queer theory should do, in Halley’s view?  Or could 
feminists intervene here with a simultaneous acknowledgment of the annoying nature of the yuppie, 
of the media coverage, and of Bersani’s statement?  Of course, Bersani is objecting primarily to the 
media coverage of women, and yet the yuppie women also receive derogatory treatment for the ad-
justment in their sexual practices.  They become abject beings and therefore “nauseating.”  Isn’t the 
point here that Bersani is criticizing the media for always paying attention to the population least at 
risk, thus neglecting violently those whom AIDS has most deeply affected, and also manufacturing 
prejudice?  Abjected, those women are perhaps more accurately absent and erased than humiliated.  
See also Leo Bersani, Gay Presence, in HOMOS 11 (1995).  Douglas Crimp also writes extensively on the 
reactionary, moralistic, and dangerously bigoted response to HIV/AIDS by the State, the media, 
and, importantly, by some queer activists.  See generally DOUGLAS CRIMP, MELANCHOLIA AND 
MORALISM: ESSAYS ON AIDS AND QUEER POLITICS (2002).  Crimp merges disavowal and melancholia 
in a manner that I find a little puzzling, but his main argument concerning the need to understand 
the process of mourning and the peculiarly regressive forms of reaction to AIDS is very useful.  See 
id. 
 28. Bersani, supra note 1, at 222. 
 29. Id.  Bersani is drawing on distinctions discussed by Sigmund Freud.  See SIGMUND FREUD, 
Mourning and Melancholia (1917), reprinted in 14 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 243, 243-60 (James Strachey trans. & ed., Hogarth Press 
1964) [hereinafter FREUD, Mourning]; SIGMUND FREUD, The Ego and the Id (1923), reprinted in 19 THE 
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 12, 19-27 (James 
Strachey trans. & ed., Hogarth Press 1961) [hereinafter FREUD, Ego]. 
 30. See generally FREUD, Ego, supra note 29. 
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Disavowal functions in terms of the “superego’s moral violence,” and the 
wrong-minded attempt to erase entirely the history of a radical movement with 
a complicated history.  Melancholia is an “undoing of self,” and the melancholic 
is unable to let anything simply go.  Melancholia is inhospitable to forms of 
identity or community formation that rest on a structure of mourning and iden-
tification with dominant or subordinate groups.  Even though feminism has in-
deed been involved in supporting major miscarriages of justice, I will argue that 
feminism as a whole is not the problem Halley needs to address.  As a justice-
seeking project unafraid of removing the grounds from which it has sometimes 
misguidedly pronounced, feminism, like queer politics and theory, and in coali-
tion rather than convergence with it, may offer, through its nagging presence, 
constant critique.  Like queer studies, it can, and more often than not does, go 
beyond the category of gender, and not just in its holy alliance with race and 
class, or in the concept of intersectionality of various discourses.  Feminism, no 
more or less than queer studies, also acknowledges the failure of the concept of 
the subject containing various discourses of race, class, and gender, because 
these are never separable. As Douglas Crimp has argued, drawing on notions of 
ethico-political responsibility in Thomas Keenan’s work, which in turn draws 
from Jacques Derrida’s, there is equally a complacent, dangerous, and politically 
regressive queer activism that must be critiqued in order to understand respon-
sibly. 31  Understanding anything responsibly involves an ability to respond im-
plied within the term “responsibility.”  There should be no fear of removing all 
grounds from which responsible or moral actions are usually conducted as and 
when they are inadequate to the task of moving toward justice.  For Crimp this 
does not mean a rejection of queer theory itself.  I would say the same for femi-
nism, and it is through a similarly melancholic politics that I derive this conclu-
sion. 
Neither feminism nor queer activism are reducible to the forms of violation 
or abuse they have historically explicitly rejected or endorsed.  Feminism is not 
the problem, moralistic evaluation and its deadly consequences are.  Equally, 
feminism per se does not have to fall prey to the attribution of causality to copula 
logic, which I understand as assuming the relation between what happens to 
one woman and what happens to women more generally.  The gesture of 
“speaking for” women that is suggested in the odd configuration of “speaking 
as a woman” is an example of such causal logic, and it assumes that the copula, 
that is the connection between the subject and the predicate, can be identical.  
What is remaindered, of course, is the supplement of difference—what else is 
one besides a woman when one speaks “as a woman?”  What differences are 
embedded in the concept “woman” that are forgotten as soon as a commonality 
among women is assumed?  Some feminists, particularly those informed by 
structuralism and some forms of psychoanalysis, simply see gender as the 
 
 31. See generally CRIMP, supra note 27; THOMAS KEENAN, FABLES OF RESPONSIBILITY: ABERRATIONS 
AND PREDICAMENTS IN ETHICS AND POLITICS (1997).  Jacques Derrida’s work has also frequently ex-
plored the notion of responsibility.  See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, ACTS OF RELIGION (Gil Anidjar ed., 
2002); JACQUES DERRIDA, WITHOUT ALIBI (Peggy Kamuf trans., 2002); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF 
HOSPITALITY (Rachel Bowlby trans., 2000); JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTRES OF MARX: THE STATE OF THE 
DEBT, THE WORK OF MOURNING, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1994) [hereinaf-
ter DERRIDA, SPECTRES OF MARX]. 
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ground from which all else follows and emerges, taking note of the “supplement 
of copula” at the same time.  Indeed, it has been the dominant strain of feminist 
theory in the past twenty years to critique the position that one presumes to 
speak for all women when one speaks “as a woman.”32  As Judith Butler, re-
spectfully protesting against Gayle Rubin’s argument for distinct and discrete 
formulations of  feminist and queer politics, puts it, “But when and where femi-
nism refuses to derive gender from sex or from sexuality, feminism appears to be part of 
the very critical practice that contests the heterosexual matrix, pursuing the specific so-
cial organization of each of these relations as well as their capacity for social transforma-
tion.”33 
Butler herself references a connection between psychoanalytic and Foucaul-
tian theory to formulate her own sense through which gender is formulated in 
relation to homosexual desire, which is the unknown lost object of the modern 
subject.34  Thus homosexual desire will always threaten the gendered ego.  While 
Butler draws on a theory of  melancholia in Freudian psychoanalysis, she is also 
implicitly drawn to what many would consider to be a basic tenet of psycho-
analysis—the primacy of the sexualized libido in the constitution of the self.35  In 
many ways, she echoes Bersani’s (and to some extent Halley’s) own plea for the 
exclusivity of gender and sexuality discourse in the disintegration of the self.  
This disintegration of self would be the dissolution of the subject, even of one 
who rejects selfhood.  Without this self, of course, the relative merits of disinte-
gration could not be judged, and it would not be masochistic in any usual sense 
of the term.  Butler departs from the sexual scenario, however, in the final pages 
of The Psychic Life of Power, with the reminder that melancholia is not all about 
sexuality, or necessarily about gender.  For her, it is about the trace, that sup-
plement that has become remaindered but insists on its presence covertly: 
The ego comes into being on the condition of the “trace” of the other, who is, at 
that moment of emergence, already at a distance. To accept the autonomy of the 
ego is to forget that trace; and to accept that trace is to embark upon a process of 
 
 32. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988).  In The Supplement 
of Copula, Jacques Derrida writes of the figure of copula—the joining word suggesting identical exis-
tence of the subject and the predicate—as the emergence of supplementarity.  The word “is,” for ex-
ample, always suggests the possibility of non-identicality, and is the carrier of the supplement char-
acterizing the other’s singularity.  The copula, in its attempt to assert the self-same, actually always 
forces the possibility, or rather, inevitability, of difference.  JACQUES DERRIDA, The Supplement of Cop-
ula: Philosophy Before Linguistics, reprinted in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 175, 196 (Alan Bass trans., 
1982).  Whenever the copula exists, it carries within it the supplement of the predicate which exceeds 
the subject itself.  Id. at 200-03. 
 33. Judith Butler, Against Proper Objects, in FEMINISM MEETS QUEER THEORY 1, 12 (Elizabeth 
Weed & Naomi Schor eds., 1997).  But see Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the 
Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 300-09 (Carole S. 
Vance ed., 1984).  Halley does indeed comment on this passage, but insists that this notion of gender 
and sexuality should not be conceived as feminist.  See generally Halley, supra note 1. 
 34. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION (1997). 
 35. See generally JEAN LAPLANCHE & JEAN-BAPTISTE PONTALIS, THE LANGUAGE OF PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., 1973).  This standard dictionary of psychoanalysis by 
Laplanche and Pontalis understands most psychoanalytic categories in this light. 
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mourning that can never be complete, for no final severance could take place 
without dissolving the ego.36 
I will ultimately depart from Butler on this final point concerning the dissolution 
of the ego because it seems to me that the ego is constituted as a whole only with 
the extra-ego trace as it is manifested in the super-ego.  Melancholia, it seems to 
me, is always a threat to the ego.  The ego does not simply become constituted 
through a dependence on the melancholic trace’s nagging, repressed insistence. 
Melancholia is the affect brought about through the trace, the supplement, 
the non-identical and inassimilable, which threatens the constitution of the 
modern subject that cannot accept its demands.  It runs counter to the super-ego, 
but not as the id.  It works toward the dissolution of ego, and its modern, liberal, 
and humanistic constitution.  The self-contained sovereign subject does not de-
pend on it in anyway.  Rather, its very constitution is threatened by it. 
The resurgence of thought about mourning and melancholia in recent years 
has been remarkable.  Almost all the work related to the subject has drawn from 
psychoanalysis, or, in a slightly different vein, from Walter Benjamin’s work on 
German tragic drama and left melancholy, but the focus has not exclusively 
been on sexuality in the case of the former, or on the Holocaust in the case of the 
latter.37  AIDS and millennium hysteria, as well as the fall of Communism seem 
to be contributing factors, alongside a delayed traumatic response to the horrors 
of world wars, anti-colonial struggles, and late capitalist fundamentalisms.  
What underlies most mournful responses is attachment to and identification 
with a group or community.  Melancholia, especially when theorized through 
Freud, involves a critical relation to community, often a disidentification, and is 
accompanied by a kind of disintegration of the self occurring as a result of this 
unresolved relation which is impossible to assimilate to a “self.”  The melan-
cholic always encloses within it a “supplement of copula,” which is not equiva-
lent to an “I.”  There is always something that initially appears to be part of the 
subject, but is subsequently understood as external to it, and therefore non-
identical with it.  The non-identical supplement is a nagging presence undoing 
the self through a critical agency.  The ambivalent relation to that which is lost 
engenders a critical agency directed toward the self and thus toward the very 
concept of selfhood endorsed by the self-consolidating nature of community 
identification. 
 
 36. BUTLER, supra note 34, at 196. 
 37. See, e.g., ANNE CHENG, THE MELANCHOLY OF RACE: PSYCHOANALYSIS, ASSIMILATION, AND 
HIDDEN GRIEF (2000); CRIMP, supra note 27; DERRIDA, SPECTRES OF MARX, supra note 31; DAVID ENG, 
RACIAL CASTRATION: MANAGING MASCULINITY IN ASIAN AMERICA (2001); LOSS: THE POLITICS OF 
MOURNING (David Eng & David Kazanjian eds., 2003); RANJANA KHANNA, DARK CONTINENTS: 
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND COLONIALISM (2003); JOSÉ ESTEBAN MUÑOZ, DISIDENTIFICATIONS: QUEERS OF 
COLOR AND THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICS (1999); GILLIAN ROSE, MOURNING BECOMES THE LAW 
(1996); Wendy Brown, Resisting Left Melancholy (Left Conservatism: A Workshop), 26 BOUNDARY 2 19, 
19-27 (1999).  The relevant sources for much of this scholarship include: NICOLAS ABRAHAM & MARIA 
TOROK, Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection versus Incorporation, in THE SHELL AND THE KERNEL 125 
(Nicholas T. Rand ed. & trans., 1994); WALTER BENJAMIN, THE ORIGIN OF GERMAN TRAGIC DRAMA 
(John Osborne trans., 1977); Walter Benjamin, Left-wing Melancholy, in THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 
SOURCEBOOK 304 (Anton Kaes et al. eds., 1994). 
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But Bersani’s notion of the disintegration of the self is more focused on the 
exclusive way in which sexuality is formulated in feminist texts, and he brings 
his own background in psychoanalysis to bear on this work.38  Halley criticizes 
him for his valuation, and perhaps “celebration” of the subordinated figure, 
echoing as it does cultural feminism’s apparent validation of all things sup-
pressed that are rendered feminine.39  Bersani implicitly valorizes a common 
thread between the MacKinnonite version of women’s relation to sexuality that 
MacKinnon cannot validate herself, but which, according to Bersani, does a 
good job of assessing in terms of subordination and humiliation.40  He under-
stands subordination, however, in terms of a psychoanalytically conceived jouis-
sance, a state of extreme pleasure and pain beyond all recognition of anything 
commonly understood as happiness or pleasure in the ego.41  Writing of a “self-
shattering” that is distinct from an anecdotal “masochism to which the melan-
choly of the post-Oedipal superego’s moral masochism is wholly alien,” Bersani 
proposes a disintegration distinct from one which could be discussed within the 
terms of an already existing sovereign subject.42  I would depart slightly from 
Bersani’s phrasing here.  His proposal of the “melancholy of the post-Oedipal  
superego”43 runs counter to my own understanding of melancholia.  Freud theo-
rized the superego only in 1923.44  While it is true that Freud refashioned his no-
tion of “critical agency” as the “conscience” of the morally regulating and nor-
malizing superego, this critical agency was no longer melancholic.  His concept 
of melancholia remained unresolved, but the “critical agency” of melancholia 
was understood as “diseased” because of an ambivalence felt toward the thing 
lost.45  Ambivalent rather than judgmental, the ego is undone by melancholia, 
not reaffirmed in its sovereignty through compliance to the demands of the su-
perego.46 
For Bersani, this queer jouissance is quite different from that experienced by 
any other marginalized or abused groups.  He writes: 
 
 38. Bersani discusses his work THE FREUDIAN BODY: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ART (1986) in his ar-
ticle, Is the Rectum a Grave?  Bersani, supra note 1, at 217-18. 
 39. Halley, supra note 1, at 20-22. 
 40. Bersani, supra note 1, at 214-15. 
 41. Id. at 222.  I note in passing Tim Dean’s interesting reminder that Bersani derives his notion 
of pleasure more from Bataille than from the Lacanian psychoanalysis one might expect.  Tim Dean, 
The Psychoanalysis of AIDS, 63 OCTOBER 83, 115 (1993).  It seems to me, however, that even though 
there are great distinctions between Bataille and Lacan, the latter draw from a common pool of psy-
choanalytic and surrealist thinking on the subject.  David Macey probably overstates the case of La-
can’s surrealism, but his book LACAN IN CONTEXTS is nonetheless informative on this matter.  See 
DAVID MACEY, LACAN IN CONTEXTS (1989). Bersani brings psychoanalysis and Bataille together, writ-
ing: “From the Freudian perspective, we might say that Bataille reformulates this self-shattering into 
the sexual as a kind of nonanecdotal self-debasement, as a masochism to which the melancholy of 
the post-Oedipal super-ego’s moral masochism is wholly alien, and in which, so to speak, the self is 
exuberantly discarded.”  Bersani, supra note 1, at 217-18. 
 42. Bersani, supra note 1, at 217-18. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See FREUD, Ego, supra note 29. 
 45. FREUD, Mourning, supra note 29, at 256-57. 
 46. Id. at 256-58.  I have discussed this concept of melancholia more fully in my book.  See 
KHANNA, supra note 37. 
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An authentic gay male political identity therefore implies a struggle not only 
against definitions of maleness and of homosexuality as they are reiterated and 
imposed in a heterosexist social discourse, but also against those very same 
definitions so seductively and so faithfully reflected by those (in large part cul-
turally invented and elaborated) male bodies that we carry within us as perma-
nently renewable sources of excitement. 
There is, however, perhaps a way to explode this ideological body.  I want to 
propose, instead of a denial of what I take to be important (if politically un-
pleasant) truths about male homosexual desire, an arduous representational dis-
cipline.  The sexist power that defines maleness in most human cultures can eas-
ily survive social revolutions; what it perhaps cannot survive is a certain way of 
assuming, or taking on, that power.  If, as Weeks puts it, gay men “gnaw at the 
roots of a male homosexual identity,” it is not because of a paradistic distance 
that they take from that identity, but rather because, from within their nearly 
mad identification with it, they never cease to feel the appeal of its being violated.47 
In an attempt to simultaneously critique the manifestations of masculinity in 
sexist human cultures, and also the pastoralization of sex in gay male political 
identity, Bersani proposes a politics built through the masochism of dissolu-
tion.48  Though Halley is quite critical of a kind of celebration of male homosex-
ual masochism and the imposition of the value-form onto sexuality, she none-
theless is attracted to the politics derived from it.49  For her, Bersani’s idea, 
slightly reformulated, allows for a sexuality unconfined in any way by the 
value-form.50 
In spite of the fact that Bersani attributes value to characteristics of subor-
dination, he does not conclude with a validation of queer identity manufactured 
from what Wendy Brown might call “a state of injury” in which she looks to 
identity formation functions “not as a supplement to class politics, not as an ex-
pansion of left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching 
augmentation of progressive formulations of power and persons”—all of which 
they also are— “but as tethered to a formulation of justice that reinscribes a 
bourgeois (masculinist) ideal as its measure.”51  Rather, his concept of the “hu-
miliation of the self” wrests subordination discourse from a bourgeois logic of 
value and exchange in which the onto-phenomenological is reduced to a meas-
ure of regulation and exchangeability.52  And his anti-identitarian and anti-
communitarian stance thus allows for a critical agency and a politics which con-
tinue to undo normative sexual practice.53 
 
 47. Bersani, supra note 1, at 209. 
 48. Id. at 218-222. 
 49. Halley, supra note 1, at 25. 
 50. Id. at 25-27. 
 51. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 59 (1995). 
 52. Bersani, supra note 1, at 217-18. 
 53. This idea of the value-form is something discussed by Karl Marx and Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak.  See generally KARL MARX, 2 CAPITAL (Friedrich Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling 
trans., 1885) (discussing the idea of value-form); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Scattered Speculations 
on the Question of Value, in IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITICS 154 (1987) (a brilliant 
reading of notions of the value-form in relation to the onto-phenomenological).  Alexander García 
Düttman writes of the disunity of existence brought about through the violent dislocation that has 
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But how does this critical agency function?  And what relation does it bear 
to reality-testing and the potential undoing of ego?  Bersani derives his notion of 
the violence of the “sanction for violence” enabled by the “practical ideal” of the 
self elevated to “the status of an ethical ideal” from Freudian notions of sexual-
ity as well as of mourning, melancholia, and the super-ego.54  In Freud’s career, a 
critical agency once associated with melancholia, or the failure to assimilate loss 
into the ego through a form of reality-testing that confirms existence of the self 
and death of the other, was eventually formulated as the possession of the su-
perego.55  Melancholia, in other words, was inadequately formulated according 
to Freud, and he would soon move its characteristics into a different realm. 
When he wrote Mourning and Melancholia in 1917, Freud proposed that the 
mourner would be involved in the process of mourning for an extended length 
of time and with great intensity.56  As the mourner is involved in “reality-
testing,” there is a resistance to the fact of the loss.57  The withdrawal of all libido 
from the object into the self meets with resistance, and often the mourner will 
cling on to the idea that the thing lost is still present.  For the mourner, however, 
reality generally wins the day, and there is gradual withdrawal of the attach-
ment, and a sustaining of the ego: “when the work of mourning is completed the 
ego becomes free and uninhibited again.”58  The melancholic, on the other hand, 
does not participate in any reality-testing, not least because the melancholic does 
not know exactly what it is that has been lost.  Even if the melancholic knows 
that someone or something no longer exists, explains Freud, there is no knowl-
edge of what exactly is lost in the process.  Because no form of reality-testing can 
clarify the nature of the loss, the melancholic turns inward.  “In mourning it is 
the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego it-
self.”59  The melancholic feels worthless, and becomes very self-critical, but this 
self-criticism, or critical agency, is not the regulating super-ego that is turned in 
toward the self in a way that would force into existence violently the sovereign 
subject.  The diseased self-critical agency has, rather, distorted the very existence 
of “self.”  Freud writes: 
[L]et us dwell for a moment on the view which the melancholic’s disorder af-
fords of the constitution of the human ego.  We see how in him one part of the 
ego sets itself over against the other, judges it critically, and, as it were, takes it 
as its object.  Our suspicion that the critical agency which is here split from the 
ego might also show its independence in other circumstances will be confirmed 
by every other observation.  We shall really find grounds for distinguishing this 
agency from the rest of the ego.  What we are here becoming acquainted with is 
the agency commonly called ‘conscience’; we shall count it, along with the cen-
 
characterized living in the time of AIDS.  See generally Alexander García Düttman, AT ODDS WITH 
AIDS: THINKING AND TALKING ABOUT A VIRUS (Peter Gilgen & Conrad Scott-Curtis trans., 1996). 
 54. FREUD, Mourning, supra note 29, at 243-58; FREUD, Ego, supra note 29, at 28-39. 
 55. See generally FREUD, Ego, supra note 29. 
 56. FREUD, Mourning, supra note 29, at 243-44. 
 57. Id. at 244-45. 
 58. Id. at 245.  However, disavowal involves the acknowledgment through reality-testing of the 
existence or non-existence of something, and a subsequent decision to ignore what reality-testing has 
demonstrated.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 246. 
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sorship of consciousness and reality-testing, among the major institutions of the 
ego, and we shall come upon evidence to show that it can be diseased on its own 
account.60 
This elaboration of the “conscience” would become fully theorized some years 
later in Freud’s essay The Ego and the Id, as the self-regulatory force of the super-
ego.61  But at the time of writing Mourning and Melancholia, Freud theorized this 
critical agency as the affect created by an excess—the thing lost that can neither 
be identified nor assimilated to the self as would be the case in mourning.62  The 
critical relation toward the ego, and not in the guise of the ego-regulating super-
ego, is exactly the force of the remainder.  That remainder cannot be assimilated, 
and it is viewed as “diseased” within the economy of the supremacy of the ego, 
or indeed, the “moral masochism” of the superego.63  It cannot let go of that 
which has been lost.  Its future will always be shaped by the demands made on 
it by the diseased critical agency, which in a sense causes a break in relation to 
historical time. 
Quite different from disavowal, in which the subject knows very well, mel-
ancholia embraces the unknown and undoes the ego in the process.  Therefore 
there is no real possibility of identification with the thing lost, even though there 
is a “diseased” embrace between the disintegrating ego and the inassimilable 
remainder.  Through disintegration, the question of value itself is somewhat un-
dermined.  The “disidentification” with the ego controlled by the super-ego 
cannot simply lead to the valuation of the subordinated.  It is indeed the very 
structure undone that is Bersani’s focus of interest.  This is not the valuing of an 
object.  It is the refusal of the ego because of the problematic relation to the ab-
ject, inassimilable, lost and possibly repudiated object.  Judith Butler’s Psychic 
Life of Power has explored this form of disidentification extensively.64  For her, the 
unknown lost object is homosexual desire, which threatens “the gendered char-
acter of the ego.”65  If gender and heterosexuality are built on the repudiation of 
the homosexual, then one would have to acknowledge also the refusal of the 
feminine which accompanies heterosexuality in the male.  The girl child comes 
into womanhood also through the repudiation of the feminine as first love ob-
ject, hence leading to the very problematic identification with the mother.66  Per-
haps, however, the term disidenitification already suggests an ego and active re-
sistance from it, rather than the dissolution I favor. 
Douglas Crimp has written extensively on the “moralistic repudiation of 
gay men in the pre-AIDS years” by post-AIDS queer theory.67  Identification 
with a normative heterosexual order, which probably culminates in the demand 
for the right of gay marriage, is a repudiation of the apparently “immature” 
 
 60. Id. at 247. 
 61. See generally FREUD, Ego, supra note 29. 
 62. FREUD, Mourning, supra note 29, at 245. 
 63. Bersani, supra note 1, at 218. 
 64. BUTLER, supra note 33, at 132-66. 
 65. Id. at 136. 
 66. Id. 
 67. CRIMP, supra note 27, at 9. 
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years of gay life and has led to a highly regressive form of queer politics.68  The 
condemnation of sexual practices and lifestyles that has accompanied AIDS dis-
course has of course done nothing to solve the problem of AIDS: it has func-
tioned to ignore those most vulnerable to the illness.69  Michael Warner has also 
written extensively on the conservative and normative desire which has made 
gay marriage the most public queer activist presence today.70  This brings up the 
question more generally of progressive activism participating without skepti-
cism in right discourse.  I will discuss this more fully in what is to come.  Brown 
and Halley have also written on the problematic focus on rights that has charac-
terized much left activism in recent years.71 
Michael Warner’s book, The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics 
of Queer Life, interestingly invokes the category of ethics to counter the current 
dominance in queer political discourse around marriage.  For him, the ethical 
position to take would be to critique gay marriage and the regressive trappings 
of social respectability that go along with it.72  Following the psychoanalytic dis-
course we have been pursuing here, one could propose that this withdrawal 
from social respectability can also, at its most radical, constitute the disintegra-
tion of the onto-phenomenological category of the ego.  The critical agency of 
melancholia would thus constitute not the normative categories of the law of the 
ego, but rather the demand for pursuit of justice. 
Halley’s decision to take a break from feminism cannot, I would suggest, 
ultimately respond to the melancholic remainder that is most effective in wrest-
ing politics from the conservative constraints of the superego.  In fact, her dis-
avowal of feminism leaves no room for active critique.  Disavowal is acting out 
in relation to the failings of some forms of feminism, which seem to have failed 
Halley.  Halley’s peculiar endorsement of Bersani is that, unlike him, she re-
mains in the realm of parodic acting out rather than an undoing of self through 
the darkness of jouissance.  In fact, this acting out is more of an assertion of self-
hood and the moral prescription against pastoralized views of sex, than it is a 
radical undoing.  If queer, indeed, is an undoing of self, then this acting out is 
functioning within a heterosexist paradigm involving identification with moral 
violence.  It takes no account at all of the value-form it endorses, because it can-
not acknowledge the formative and problematic relation to the supplement.  
Critical melancholia, rather, embodies the undoing of self and simultaneously 
enacts the critique of self.  We do not simply see the self undone.  Self is undone 
with the recognition of violence performed through the normative categories of 
valuation, the onto-phenomenological, the subject, and the human. 
What would a politics derived from this model of attention to the abjected 
singularity of the melancholic embrace look like?  And if I choose to call this 
melancholic politics a form of feminist ethics, where exactly does this leave de-
mands for rights that have so characterized feminist and queer activism in the 
 
 68. See id. at 1-26. 
 69. Id. at 43-82. 
 70. See generally MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS 
OF QUEER LIFE (1999). 
 71. See generally Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 1 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
 72. WARNER, supra note 70, at 81-148. 
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recent past?  If rights are indeed always compromised by a notion of the onto-
phenomenological built on the regressive features of the regulatory super-ego 
and the value systems it represents, are we to do away with them entirely as 
sources for legal pursuit?  Halley, following Bersani, sees a politics derived from 
the dissolution of the self as something peculiar to homosexuality rather than to 
melancholia more generally.73  What would it mean to take this a step further, 
and to have a politics built from the very undoing afforded through melancholia 
of other sorts?  When we acknowledge the singularity of sexuality in its current 
relation to AIDS discourse, are we to abandon the legal to endless mourning, 
never finding any possibility of a politics based on the concept of the human?  In 
the next section, I will attempt to sketch out what this politics may look like. 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF RIGHTS AND THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE: FEMINIST 
MELANCHOLIA AND THE REMAINDER 
Human rights, and more particularized forms of named rights, such as 
women’s rights, gay rights, or animal rights, have a complicated relationship, 
not least because the demand for rights does not always have a following in the 
political realms of feminism, queer activism, or animal liberation.  One could 
obviously say that the distinction between animal rights and human rights is 
different from that between women’s rights or gay rights and human rights for 
the simple reason that animals are not human, and presumably do not aspire to 
be, whereas women and gays are human, and on one level at least, do not, there-
fore, have to aspire to be.  I say “on one level,” because the categories of 
women’s and gay rights functions as a supplement to that of human rights in a 
manner that suggests a “becoming human” of woman and homosexuals—that 
is, attaining the status by which there will be an inclusion of their rights into the 
category of human rights.  Perhaps the notion of human rights is itself “human-
ized,” as it were, through accommodating women and homosexuals within its 
realm.  But the lesson of a term like animal rights and the obvious inability to 
include the animal into a notion of human rights points toward the lesson of the 
critique of human rights discourse more generally: the liberal critique which ar-
gues for inclusion or accommodation, and the Marxist and deconstructive cri-
tiques which take issue with the forms of universalism implied in the notion of 
human qualifying that idea of “rights.”  At the heart of the issue of “rights,” es-
pecially in the international realm, is that of difference, and of course not merely 
cultural difference or difference in lifestyle. 
An ethico-political notion of reading informs my understanding of the pur-
suit of international justice.  Feminism, like queer studies, enters this ethico-
political reading practice as a means of understanding how some continue con-
sistently to be unaccounted for in this pursuit.  This notion of the ethico-political 
involves both an understanding of an abstracted form of practice, and a concrete 
relation to the other.  Deconstruction has given us the reading tools to make this 
pursuit, and I think it can be as relevant to queer theories as much as feminist 
ones. Reading involves not only attention to the parameters and laws of genre, 
context, and means of production, though it involves all of these; it also involves 
 
 73. Halley, supra note 1, at 25-27. 
080204 KHANNA2.DOC 9/17/2004  9:27 AM 
84 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 11:69 2004 
being open to the singularity of the text, that which exceeds the identifiable par-
ticularities at hand, and encountering something unsettling which seems to exist 
beyond those laws.  Deconstructionist reading, put to work in the pursuit of jus-
tice, would not necessarily endorse a “belief” in the notion of human rights, 
even though it could be through a more overt political notion of how to address 
“wrongs.”  As Spivak has pointed out, there is an asymmetry between the no-
tion of the human in the idea of human rights and human wrongs,74 in the sense 
that human wrongs concern injustice performed by humans, and the notion of 
rights seem to “belong” to the human qua human.  The questions that arise, of 
course, are what constitutes human beings, and on what grounds rights are de-
termined for them.  Even if the notion of human rights is designed to offer an 
ethical and legal neutral standard for equal treatment under the law, it is clear 
that those rights seem often arbitrarily chosen, contingent, and far from neutral 
at the moment of their inception.  At their inception they are groundless other 
than through politics and its notion of the citizen-subject or human. 
This is one of the many lessons Jacques Derrida, the franco-maghrebi decon-
structive philosopher, gives us in his essay, Force of Law, originally a talk written 
for presentation at the Cardozo Law School.75  He argues that once a law is in 
place, there can be determinations made concerning its enforceability, legiti-
macy, and whether it has been broken.76  It creates its own guidelines, even in 
instances in which these are highly debatable.  He refers us back, however, to 
the moment at which the law is established, when there is no foundation as such 
for it, and when the sovereign, violently exempting “himself” from legal en-
forcement, determines what laws are employed and subsequently enforced on 
others.  Law may seem like a stable entity built on a hefty foundation, but as 
soon as one looks at its origins, that foundation is revealed as either mystical or 
arbitrary, or both.77 
However, rather than feel despair about this baselessness of the law, the 
recognition that it is without foundation, legal or otherwise, is paradoxically the 
moment in which it is revealed as political rather than ethical.  The mode of as-
sessment, critique, or reading, thus shifts.  One is left without a stable means of 
justification, value assignment, response, or indeed alibi.  For no foregone ethi-
cal standards unquestionably provide the basis for action, response, or interven-
tion, humanitarian or otherwise.  Responsibility becomes based on the ability to 
respond to the singularity of the other, of a situation, or of an event.  It involves 
a political determination in the public space opened up through difference, that 
is, through the understanding of the singularity of the other that does not fit into 
any preestablished rules, the recognition that “the other,” for example, will al-
ways constitute more than an example of the general rubric employed to under-
stand it. 
It has sometimes been said that such a reading constitutes its own alibi: it 
gives an excuse, or a pretext, for ignoring the historico-political foundation of 
 
 74. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Righting Wrongs, in HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN WRONGS 168, 
168-69 (Nicholas Owen ed., 2003). 
 75. JACQUES DERRIDA, Force of Law, in ACTS OF RELIGION 228 (Gil Anidjar ed., 2002). 
 76. Id. at 251-52. 
 77. Id. at 269. 
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“other” subjects, that is, what Michel Foucault, at the end of The History of Sexu-
ality, has described as the turning of politics into biopolitics: the moment in which 
life, or natural life, becomes the terrain upon which the state’s power is played 
out.78  He writes, “[f]or millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a liv-
ing animal with the additional capacity for a political existence.”  “[M]odern 
man,” he adds, “is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being 
in question.”79  Asking us to consider the disciplinary control of what have be-
come, through state enforcement, docile bodies to be manipulated, Foucault im-
plores us to understand the genealogy of the mechanisms of biopower.80  One 
strand of feminism, especially in literary analysis, has been to locate the rules 
governing that biopower.  Even as this may be necessary, there is no reason why 
that Foucaultian biopolitical analysis would necessarily open one up to the 
other, to the extent that the recognition of the other’s singularity could constitute 
something like a risk for the observer, a challenge, or indeed damage to the 
frame of rules one lives by.  It is indeed necessary to understand the mecha-
nisms of biopower, they keep one honest as it were, like the qualifiers of rights 
like “gays’,” “women’s,” or “animal’s” to remind us of the forms of life so fre-
quently and persistently or, indeed, structurally performed in the instrumentali-
zation of community-based or “human” rights.81  And the understanding of 
those mechanisms is of course crucial to one’s responsibility to the other.  Alone, 
however, biopolitical understanding is a necessary but insufficient response, or 
an abrogation of the ability to respond to the other in the pursuit of justice for 
all. 
So how does one move toward the possibility of justice for all in the experi-
ence of the impossibility of this?  How can one guarantee justice once one has 
moved away from an established rubric, like that of human rights, which has 
historically been so arbitrary in its designation of those it possibly protects, and 
its notion of the subject overshadowed as it is by the value-form imposed onto 
the onto-phenomenological?  “Cultural difference” consistently becomes a stick-
ing point in human rights discourse, most clearly when the status of women 
with cultural origins outside the first world are at stake, having “wrongs” per-
formed against them.  All too often, “cultural difference” becomes an alibi that 
guarantees the “reader’s” own politics—status and value go unquestioned.  
(This is the problem of liberalism generally, and most strikingly in Rawlsian lib-
eralism in which the subject is presumed to be rational and individualist, and 
any awkward question of difference is relegated to the realm of the private.82  It 
is also consistently a problem in Habermasian notions of the public sphere in 
which difference and antagonism can similarly be negotiated only through his 
 
 78. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION 137-45 (Robert 
Hurley trans., 1978). 
 79. Id. at 143. 
 80. Id. at 135-59. 
 81. Jacques Derrida is particularly insistent on this point.  Derrida, supra note 75, at 257. 
 82. In THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999), John Rawls attempts to revise some of the ideas proposed in 
his book, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), to apply to a more international realm, and to therefore take 
the fact of difference into account.  The perspective, however, does not really change his relegation 
of difference to the private and his assumption of a “decent” people.  See generally RAWLS, IN THE 
LAW OF PEOPLES, supra. 
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version of the rational, in this case, a notion of what constitutes rational dis-
course).83 
In short, there are no guarantees and no alibis.  Justice has to be a move-
ment and a constant renegotiation of its political grounds.  Difference, after all, 
is not only cultural difference, and it cannot be addressed without opening one-
self potentially to challenge from the other.  Queer theory, no less than any other 
ethico-political formation, would similarly have to abandon any fixed notion of 
sexuality as revolutionary in terms of debasement at its core.  Bersani does not 
make this error.  He writes, “to want sex with another man is not exactly a cre-
dential for political radicalism.”84  An example of the problem is that much of 
even the most progressive work on sexuality and AIDS does not venture to 
think sexuality beyond European and North American contexts. 
But critique shows us the erroneous at best and tyrannical at worst compla-
cency that the notion of the human as it is employed in human rights and “hu-
manitarian intervention” consistently allows.  For example, even prior to the 
current war in Iraq, discussion of the “humanitarian” intervention of the United 
Nations (UN) relegated it to the position of hospital, rather than political player.  
So the war in the United States and British governments’ discourse gets errone-
ously rationalized because of agreement to “care” after Iraq is once again ripped 
apart through the instruments of sovereign power and the state of exception.  
No form of humanitarian work has changed the way in which prisoners are 
rendered as caged animals in Guantanamo Bay.  For another example, Kofi An-
nan gets promoted to Secretary General in spite of the fact that he is directly re-
sponsible for UN inaction during the horrifying Rwanda genocide.  Reporting 
on human wrongs, transparency, and the institutionalization of liberal notions 
of the human is incontrovertibly no guarantee of any humanitarian advance-
ment; in fact in practice it all too often seems quite the opposite when the power-
ful relegation of some to the status of non-human seems permissible.  Another 
example is that the status of women in Afghanistan, though admittedly atro-
cious, was used as a humanitarian justification for war, while women’s demands 
were consistently ignored, and the war ultimately resulted in very little change.85  
“Humanist” notions of empathy were shown to have failed as a foundation of 
ethical response in Bosnia, when genocide was played out on (and perhaps as-
sisted through) television screens internationally, eliciting no guarantees for ac-
tion and the protection of life.86 
Liberalism is consistently anti-political in its preference for terms like “hu-
manity” and “universalism” as opposed to “the people,” “the event,” “the situa-
tion,” “the citizenry,” and “the international.”  Etienne Balibar, in his reading of 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen calls our attention to that ten-
sion between man and citizen, asking whether one is designated human with 
access to rights because one is a citizen, or whether one is citizen because one 
 
 83. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
(Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990). 
 84. Bersani, supra note 1, at 205. 
 85. See Ranjana Khanna, Taking a Stand for Afghanistan: Women and the Left, 28 SIGNS 464, 464-65 
(2002). 
 86. Thomas Keenan, Publicity and Indifference (Sarajevo on Television), 117 PMLA 1, 104 (2002). 
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has access to human rights.87  Hannah Arendt tried to solve this problem by de-
manding citizenship for all, legitimating everyone as human with access to 
rights.88  Writing of refugees, she criticized the concept of an ethical humanity in 
favor of political international democracy.89  Like Balibar many years later, Ar-
endt draws on the scandal of the separation between human and citizen in the 
Declaration of 1789.90  She writes: 
No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than 
the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly 
insist on regarding as “inalienable” those human rights, which are enjoyed only 
by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of 
the rightless themselves. Their situation has deteriorated just as stubbornly, un-
til the internment camp—prior to the Second World War the exception rather 
than the rule for the stateless—has become the routine solution . . .91 
Arendt was discussing those who had no citizenship, but we could claim the 
analytical critique for all those who demand particularized rights that seem to 
function as a supplement to human rights.  Yet Arendt’s solution seems inade-
quate to the task of pursuing justice, because the logic of rights and citizenship, 
and indeed of the human, always leave a remainder or supplement, and are thus 
always held hostage to the normalization that takes place in the process of be-
coming citizen, and the psychical consequences of that. 
The psychoanalytic construction of the subject was constituted through the 
colonial relation, at the time of the consolidation of the European nation-state, 
and the melancholic subject was one constituted through a critical agency that 
had already lost the ideal of nation-statehood, corrupted (and constituted) as it 
was through the colonial relation.  This melancholic subject effectively became a 
non-subject.92  The melancholic relation exists as a result of the loss of an ideal.  
In the context of colonialism, this ideal was often the idea of the nation-state, the 
sovereign subject, and sovereignty within the nation-state.  If European nation-
states were formulated out of their relation to the colonies, then those states al-
ways required a supplement within which sovereignty cannot be achieved.  The 
ideal of freedom and sovereignty for all embedded in the ideology of the nation-
state was thus always a contradiction that could be seen in the existence of the 
colonies.  That existence always existed within the context of the “supplement” 
to the nation-state, that is, the colony.  Those non-subjects within the colonies 
were to conceive the possibility of their sovereignty and their coming into sub-
jecthood through the ideal of nationhood which appeared to give everyone the 
possibility of relative sovereignty and citizenship.  That supplement, however, 
not recognized as such, was to always undo the postcolonial subject, revealing 
the critical gap between the manifest instantiation of nation, citizen, law, repre-
 
 87. ETIENNE BALIBAR, Rights of Man and Rights of the Citizen: the Modern Dialectic of Equality and 
Freedom, in MASSES, CLASSES, IDEAS: STUDIES ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY BEFORE AND AFTER MARX 
39, 44-50 (James Swenson trans., 1994). 
 88. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 302 (1979). 
 89. Id. at 267-302. 
 90. Id. at 298-99. 
 91. Id. at 279. 
 92. For a more extensive discussion of this idea see KHANNA, supra note 37. 
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sented, and valued, and the melancholic supplement.  Having manifestly lost 
the ideal of nationhood, without realizing exactly what had been lost, the mel-
ancholic “non-subject of the political”93 would always perform the critical 
agency that would critique its attachment to the ideal.  The remaindered trace 
would always manifest a slippage that demands something different for the in-
adequate political.  The melancholic insistence of that trace would reveal the 
ethical, justice, subaltern, and use that the political could never respond to.  The 
demand of the melancholic, whose critical agency runs counter to the normaliz-
ing disavowal which is the property of the superego, is the call for justice. 
If feminism has too often been associated with the repressive nature of 
normalizing moralism, as well as colonial and racial violence in its historical 
constitution, being responsible to the not human will involve a simultaneous at-
tentiveness to the demands of that unknowable entity, woman, however she is 
defined.  This does not mean valuing everything women think, feel, or want, or 
demanding the right on behalf of women as if it were progressive.  Feminism, 
no more or less than queer activism and theory, could constitute the space of 
hope, marked as it is by its own history of violence, and its own specters de-
manding justice.94 
Though melancholia is about the critical agency that challenges the norma-
tive onto-phenomenological structure of the ego, it is not unquestionably ethical 
or just, and it would be naive to think of politics marked by melancholia as in-
herently radical and untouched by normative and regressive politics.  It is cer-
tainly not the case that a psychical, physical, or juridical investment in homo-
sexuality automatically amounts to the absence of gendered, sexual, racial, or 
capitalist violence and prejudice.  The melancholic, after all, is something of a 
wretched figure precisely because of the weight of the normative value system 
upon which ego-constitution rests, and exactly an ambivalent response to the 
lost object.  The question of value, however full the power of critique brought 
against it, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has suggested, will always include 
“the impossibility of a full undoing.”95  As I have explained elsewhere, “a psy-
chic contingency in the present embodies within it the persistence of history . . . 
not simply as fantasy or as memory, but also as archive distinct from memory.”96  
The melancholic’s undoing of the ego, however, manifests alterity and thus the 
call for justice.  And it is not, as in the case with Bersani and Halley, the exclu-
sive property of queer politics.97 
 
 93. This phrase comes from Alberto Moreiras’ work in progress, and I thank him for having 
given me the opportunity to discuss the topic with him. 
 94. While I greatly admire the work of Gillian Rose, I find her frustration with contemporary 
work on mourning and melancholia to exaggerate the nihilism in what she refers to as “postmodern 
thinking.”  Her works, MOURNING BECOMES THE LAW: PHILOSOPHY AND REPRESENTATION (1996) and 
DIALECTIC OF NIHILISM: POST-STRUCTURALISM AND LAW (1984), see only an undoing in the form of 
critique proposed through deconstruction, and no possibility of a space of politics. 
 95. Spivak, supra note 32, at 154. 
 96. See KHANNA, supra note 37, at 228. 
 97. In a more recent essay, Bersani has called his notion of a politics built on masochism as irre-
sponsible, failing as it does to produce any idea of sociality through which a politics could emerge.  
Perhaps, however, ethico-political relation to the other, centered around the idea of melancholia, 
would inevitably remain attached to the social, as it is the self that becomes impoverished as one 
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The undoing of the ego present in the structure of melancholia is always a 
dual negotiation between dissolution of the ego and simultaneously attachment 
to it and the names to which it remains attached.  Melancholia is not just about 
coming undone, of course, it is always about the critical relation outside of the 
moralism of the superego.  Halley, following Bersani, sees gay men as never 
ceasing to feel the appeal of its (their identity) being violated.98  I propose that 
acknowledging the singularity of this position does not demand a sense of the 
exclusivity of queer theory understanding the import of the dissolution of the 
ego, and the moral violence of both the value form and the super-ego.99  Perhaps 
the question of queer and feminist are simply issues of semantics.  But, for a 
reader, naming, semantics, and signatures are never really that simple. 
IV.  THE SIGNATURE 
Jacques Derrida, speaking of AIDS, says: 
If I spoke a moment ago of an event and of indestructibility, it is because al-
ready, at the dawn of this very new and ever so ancient thing, we know that, 
even should humanity some day come to control the virus (it will take at least a 
generation), still, even in the most unconscious symbolic zones, the traumatism 
has irreversibly affected our experience of desire and of what we blithely call in-
tersubjectivity, the relation to the alter ego, and so forth.100 
He is, of course, pointing to the remainder that will always exist concerning the 
trauma of AIDS and its massive effects and disruption on all “symbolic zones,” 
undoing any notion of humanity that existed prior to the event, or any notion of 
history outside that of the traumatic break brought about through the impossi-
bility of understanding AIDS.  Regulated notions of temporality and stable no-
tions of the human come undone.  And in itself recognition of a change that is 
mired in melancholia and countless remainders, comes a responsibility to the 
other, to the remainder, to that which contaminates. 
This, I would propose, is the manifestation of critical melancholia.  It is not 
only the trauma of AIDS discussed here, amounting to a change in subjecthood; 
rather, it is a radical change in relationality and subjectivity marked by the sin-
gular and unique event of AIDS.  AIDS has left its signature on any kind of sub-
jectivity or dissolution we could begin to imagine.  An ethical relation to it for 
Derrida involves being undone by the event, even when it becomes curable.  A 
melancholic ethico-politics must always be attentive to the remainder.  The re-
mainder is the thing apparently lost which cannot be identified as such.  No 
form of complete mourning becomes possible, nor any form of a rejected or dis-
avowed reality.  The remainder that insists itself will always be that which un-
 
suspends oneself in the other’s text, according to Freud, and not the world.  See Leo Bersani, Sociality 
and Sexuality, 26 CRITICAL INQUIRY 641, 641-56 (2000); FREUD, Mourning, supra note 29, at 246. 
 98. Halley, supra note 1, at 15-17. 
 99. Bersani, supra note 1, at 209.  Such attachment to the remainder and its undoing of the sub-
ject is also not only a factor in the deconstructive thought of Jacques Derrida.  We similarly see this 
tension in such post-Marxist thinkers like Jean-Luc Nancy.  See generally JEAN-LUC NANCY, THE 
INOPERATIVE COMMUNITY (Peter Conner et al. trans., 1991). 
 100. Jacques Derrida, The Rhetoric of Drugs, in POINTS . . . : INTERVIEWS 1974-1994 228, 251 (Elisa-
beth Weber ed., Peggy Kamuf et al. trans., 1995). 
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does any definitive constitution of selfhood.  The remainder always undoes the 
frame we establish for ourselves. 
Halley, although, following Bersani, endorses the peculiar ways in which a 
politics may emerge from queer sexuality, and ultimately acts out a reinscription 
of subjectivity through her rejection of feminism.101 And she does this through 
the signature of Ian, as if that signature did not carry the trace of Janet.  Perhaps 
this is parody, but why does it manifest itself for Ian in the rejection, or breaking 
away from Janet?  The move from Janet to Ian is equivalent to the movement 
from feminist to queer.  This notion of what is “queer” functions in terms of the 
copula.  Woman and feminist are of course not equivalents, other than in the 
moral violence of heterosexist aggression, and the normative values built 
through the superego’s aggressive division of the sexes.  There is no reason for 
Ian to stop being Janet.  Ian’s signature carries the trace of Janet, just as queer 
theory carries the trace of feminism. 
Ian’s signature carries the trace of something else in it, and this notion of 
queer as carrying the trace of the past, of difference, and of remainder carries 
with it the “impossibility of a full undoing.”  Neither Janet nor Ian can become 
completely undone within a melancholic framework, precisely because the criti-
cal agency will always be in the relation of critique of the self, undoing and yet 
reminding of the remainder of self.  Ian seems to want to write as if a signature 
really can do the work of sustaining self-identity, coherence, prior and future ex-
istence in the realm of the same and continuous, all of which is put into doubt 
by the very necessity of it.102  Ian has not put feminism into question, he has 
acted out through disavowal.  He has effectively rejected the critical relation in 
favor of abandonment, and has shored up his selfhood in the process.  He has 
repeated and reinforced a heterosexist framework, and through disavowal has 
parodied melancholia as a radical and critical undoing of self. 
Disavowal, the ignoring of the trace, cannot realize the undoing of self that 
occurs in melancholia.  Halley is essentially saying, “I know very well about the 
existence of Janet, but even so, I choose to disregard her and let Ian speak for 
me.”  The signature, while proposing a being that may have been there at the 
time of writing, and may not have been, nonetheless calls upon the proper name 
and its gendered identifications.  The signature leaves a trace of singularity, 
even as it is lost as the enunciating communicator.  The signature, by its very na-
ture, is always a copy, and a trace of it is assumed to exist elsewhere, designat-
ing as it does the absence of the signatory.  What is absent always throws some 
doubt on the assurance apparently afforded through the signature.  Ian carries 
in him the trace of Janet, and she poses a question about why identification with 
the masculine has occurred.  The trace of her allows for the possibility of cri-
tique, and it also undoes both Ian and Janet as stable entities.  In doing so, s/he 
is able to speak. 
The impossibility of signature in my title refers not to the ways in which it 
is at times not possible to sign, so much as the ways in which the signature al-
ways carries within it the very undoing of its task of sustaining continuity, and 
maintaining particularity. The written text itself will always be singular in the 
 
 101. See Halley, supra note 1, at 26-27. 
 102. See DERRIDA, Signature, supra note 7, at 19-21. 
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way traces of the other are manifested.  Acknowledging the affective connection 
to the other while simultaneously beginning to work it through, is the melan-
cholic’s job.  Ian’s plea to take a break from feminism needs to be seen as an act-
ing out of disavowal unable to acknowledge a relation and unable to perform 
critique.  There is no argument made in Halley’s article which proposes a reason 
to ignore the  demands made by the questions and the repressions of sexisms in 
all their complexities.  The possibility of critique is entirely foreclosed, some-
what paradoxically for a piece of celebratory support of queer sexuality that en-
dorses the moral violence of the value-form. 
Gillian Rose, writing rather despairingly of the melancholic nature of con-
temporary theory, proposes replacing the lament of the trauerspiel or tragedy 
with the possibilities of comedy.103  She may well have overstated the case, but it 
does seem that the genre of comedy did allow for a breaking out of character to 
make a political statement.  In Greek Comedy this was referred to as parabasis.  
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History 
of the Vanishing Present calls for “a permanent parabasis,” the breaking out of a 
frame for direct (and non-representative) political commentary.104  This breaking 
out of the frame, the attempt to recognize the trace as the undoing of self, and 
the consequent effort to responsible openness and to constant critique, is what 
makes feminism for me a justice seeking project.  Working with the law, and al-
ways critiquing it, feminism moves with and against an idea of the human, the 
ego, the sexed and gendered subject, and the proper name designated in a signa-
ture or the ownership of copyright. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A ruthlessly vigilant and constant ethico-politics informed by feminism, 
and a reading practice open to the other includes all notions of alterity, animal, 
human, or otherwise.  In its focus on singularity, there can be no set of consistent 
rules applied to a substitutable other in the name of neutrality.  Rather, the 
reader is marked as substitutable in his or her openness to the singularity and 
particularity of the other.  It opens one up to the necessity of change through a 
politics without alibi, and a challenge to the forms of violation performed in our 
name and to our economic benefit.  It is through this understanding of the rela-
tion between the particular and the singular that we can move toward justice.  It 
is only in this relation that responsible acts and ethico-political writing can take 
place. 
 
 
 103. ROSE, supra note 37, at 63-76. 
 104. GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON: TOWARD A HISTORY 
OF THE VANISHING PRESENT 430 (1999). 
